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Abstract
What does it mean for a machine learning
model to be ‘fair’, in terms which can be
operationalised? Should fairness consist of
ensuring everyone has an equal probabil-
ity of obtaining some benefit, or should we
aim instead to minimise the harms to the
least advantaged? Can the relevant ideal
be determined by reference to some alter-
native state of affairs in which a particu-
lar social pattern of discrimination does not
exist? Various definitions proposed in re-
cent literature make different assumptions
about what terms like discrimination and
fairness mean and how they can be defined
in mathematical terms. Questions of dis-
crimination, egalitarianism and justice are
of significant interest to moral and polit-
ical philosophers, who have expended sig-
nificant efforts in formalising and defending
these central concepts. It is therefore un-
surprising that attempts to formalise ‘fair-
ness’ in machine learning contain echoes of
these old philosophical debates. This paper
draws on existing work in moral and politi-
cal philosophy in order to elucidate emerg-
ing debates about fair machine learning.
Keywords: fairness, discrimination,
machine learning, algorithmic decision-
making, egalitarianism
1. Introduction
Machine learning allows us to predict and
classify phenomena, by training models using
labeled data from the real world. When conse-
quential decisions are made about individuals
on the basis of the outputs of such models,
concerns about discrimination and fairness
inevitably arise. What if the model’s outputs
result in decisions that are systematically
biased against people with certain protected
characteristics like race, gender or religion? If
there are underlying patterns of discrimination
in the real world, such biases will likely be
picked up in the learning process. This could
result in certain groups being unfairly denied
loans, insurance, or employment opportuni-
ties. Cognisant of this problem, a burgeoning
research paradigm of ‘discrimination-aware
data mining’ and ‘fair machine learning’ has
emerged, which attempts to detect and mitigate
unfairness Hajian and Domingo-Ferrer (2013);
Kamiran et al. (2013); Barocas and Selbst
(2016).
One question which immediately arises in such
an endeavour is the need for formalisation. What
does it mean for a machine learning model to
be ‘fair’ or ‘non-discriminatory’, in terms which
can be operationalised? Various measures have
been proposed. A common theme is compar-
ing differences in treatment between protected
and non-protected groups, but there are multi-
ple ways to measure such differences. The most
basic would be ‘disparate impact’ or ‘statisti-
cal / demographic parity’, which consider the
overall percentage of positive/ negative classifi-
cation rates between groups. However, this is
blunt, since it fails to account for discrimina-
tion which is explainable in terms of legitimate
grounds Dwork et al. (2012). For instance, at-
tempting to enforce equal impact between men
and women in recidivism prediction systems, if
men have higher re-offending rates, could result
in women remaining in prison longer despite be-
ing less likely to re-offend.
A range of more nuanced measures have been
proposed, including; ‘accuracy equity’, which
considers the overall accuracy of a predictive
model for each group Angwin et al. (2016); ‘con-
ditional accuracy equity’, which considers the ac-
curacy of a predictive model for each group, con-
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ditional on their predicted class Dieterich et al.
(2016); ‘equality of opportunity’, which considers
whether each group is equally likely to be pre-
dicted a desirable outcome given the actual base
rates for that group Hardt et al. (2016); and ‘dis-
parate mistreatment’, a corollary which considers
differences in false positive rates between groups
Zafar et al. (2017). Another definition involves
imagining counterfactual scenarios wherein mem-
bers of protected groups are instead members of
the non-protected group Kusner et al. (2017).
To the extent that outcomes would differ, the
system is unfair; i.e. a woman classified by a
fair system should get the same classification she
would have done in a counterfactual scenario in
which she had been born a man.
Ideally, a system might be expected to meet
all of these intuitively plausible measures of fair-
ness. But, somewhat problematically, certain
measures turn out to be mathematically impos-
sible to satisfy simultaneously except in rare and
contrived circumstances Kleinberg et al. (2016),
and therefore hard choices between fairness met-
rics must be made before the technical work of
detecting and mitigating unfairness can proceed.
A further underlying tension is that fairness may
also imply that similar people should be treated
similarly, but this is often in tension with the
ideal of parity between groups, when base rates
for the target variable are different between those
groups Dwork et al. (2012). Fair machine learn-
ing therefore faces an upfront set of conceptual
ethical challenges; which measures of fairness are
most appropriate in a given context? Which vari-
ables are legitimate grounds for differential treat-
ment, and why? Are all instances of disparity
between groups objectionable? Should fairness
consist of ensuring everyone has an equal prob-
ability of obtaining some benefit, or should we
aim instead to minimise the harms to the least
advantaged? In making such tradeoffs, should
the decision-maker consider only the harms and
benefits imposed within the decision-making con-
text, or also those faced by decision-subjects in
other contexts? What relevance might past, fu-
ture or inter-generational injustices have?
Such questions of discrimination and fairness
have long been of significant interest to moral
and political philosophers, who have expended
significant efforts in formalising, differentiating
and debating many of the central concepts in-
volved. It is therefore unsurprising that attempts
to formalise fairness in machine learning contain
echoes of these old philosophical debates. Indeed,
some seminal work in the FAT-ML community
explicitly refers to political philosophy as inspi-
ration, albeit in a limited and somewhat ad-hoc
way.1 A more comprehensive overview could pro-
vide a wealth of argumentation which may use-
fully apply to the questions arising in the pur-
suit of more ethical algorithmic decision-making.
This article aims to provide an overview of some
of the relevant philosophical literature on dis-
crimination, fairness and egalitarianism in order
to clarify and situate the emerging debate within
the discrimination-aware and fair machine learn-
ing literature. Throughout, I aim to address the
conceptual distinctions drawn between terms fre-
quently used in the fair ML literature–including
‘discrimination’ and ‘fairness’–and the use of re-
lated terms in the philosophical literature. The
purpose of this is not merely to consider similar-
ities and differences between the two discourses,
but to map the terrain of the philosophical de-
bate and locate those points which provide help-
ful clarification for future research on algorith-
mic fairness, or otherwise raise relevant problems
which have yet to be considered in that research.
I begin by discussing philosophical accounts
of what discrimination is and what makes it
wrong, if and when it is wrong. I show how on
certain accounts of what makes discrimination
wrong, the proposed conditions are unlikely to
obtain in algorithmic decision-making contexts.
If correct, these accounts do not necessarily im-
ply that algorithmic decision-making is always
morally benign–only that its potential wrongness
is not to be found in the notion of discrimination
as it is traditionally understood. This leads us
to consider other grounds on which algorithmic
decision-making might be problematic, which are
primarily captured by a variety of considerations
connected to the ideals of egalitarianism–the no-
tion that human beings are in some fundamen-
tal sense equal and that efforts should be made
to avoid and correct certain forms of inequality.
This discussion suggests that ‘fairness’ as used
in the fair machine learning community is best
1. Notable examples include references to the work of
authors such as H. Peyton Young, John Rawls, and
John Roemer in Dwork et al. (2012); Joseph et al.
(2016).
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understood as a placeholder term for a variety
of normative egalitarian considerations. Notably,
while egalitarianism is a widely held principle, ex-
actly what it requires is the subject of much de-
bate. I provide an overview of some of this debate
and finish with implications for the incorporation
of ‘fairness’ into algorithmic decision-making sys-
tems.
2. What is discrimination, and
what makes it wrong?
Early work which explored how to embed fair-
ness constraints in machine learning used the
term ‘discrimination-aware’ rather than ‘fair’.
While this terminological difference may seem
relatively insignificant amongst computer scien-
tists, it points to a potentially important distinc-
tion which has been the preoccupation of much
philosophical writing on the topic. For philoso-
phers, the division of moral phenomena into con-
ceptually coherent categories is both intrinsically
satisfying, and, hopefully, brings helpful clarifi-
cation to otherwise perplexing issues. Getting a
closer conceptual grip over what discrimination
consists in, what (if anything) makes it distinc-
tively wrong, and how it relates to other moral
concepts such as fairness, should therefore help
clarify whether and when algorithmic systems
can be wrongfully discriminatory and what ought
to be done about them. It may turn out that so-
called ‘algorithmic discrimination’ differs in im-
portant ways to classical forms of discrimination,
such that different counter-measures are appro-
priate.
2.1. Mental state accounts
Paradigm cases of discrimination include differ-
ential treatment on the basis of membership of
a salient social group–e.g. gender or ‘race’–by
those with decision-making power to distribute
harms or benefits. Examples include employers
who prefer to hire a male job applicant over an
equally qualified female applicant, or parole of-
ficers who impose stricter conditions on parolees
of a particular minority in comparison to a priv-
ileged majority. Focusing on these paradigm
cases, a range of accounts of what makes discrim-
ination wrong place emphasis on the intentions,
beliefs and values of the decision-maker. For
such mental state accounts, defended by among
others Richard Arneson, Thomas Scanlon, and
Annabelle Lever, the existence of systematic ani-
mosity or preferences for or against certain salient
social groups on the part of the decision-maker
is what makes discrimination wrong Arneson
(1989); Lever (2016); Scanlon (2009). Such con-
cerns might be couched in terms of the defective
moral character of the decision maker–that they
show bad intent or animosity, for example-or in
terms of the harmful effect of such intentions on
the discriminated-against individual, such as hu-
miliation as a result of lack of respect.
On such accounts, the decision-maker’s intent
is key to discrimination. A decision-maker with
no such intent, who nonetheless accidentally and
unwittingly created such disparities, would ar-
guably not be guilty of wrongful discrimination
(even if the situation is morally problematic on
other grounds). Such cases–often called indirect
or institutional discrimination in the UK, or in
the U.S., disparate impact–might still count as
discriminatory on a mental state account of dis-
crimination if the failure of decision-makers to
anticipate such disparities, or to redress them
when they become apparent, is sufficiently simi-
larly morally objectionable to the failure to treat
people equally in the first instance. However, if
such conditions do not obtain, then indirect dis-
crimination, while it may be wrong, may not use-
fully be described as an instance of discrimination
at all Eidelson (2015).
This line of thinking suggests a potential chal-
lenge to the notion of algorithmic discrimina-
tion. If the possession of certain mental states by
decision-makers is a necessary condition of a de-
cision being discriminatory, one might argue that
algorithmic decision-making systems can never
be discriminatory as such, because such systems
are incapable of possessing the relevant mental
states. This is not the place for discussion of the
possibility of machine consciousness, but assum-
ing that it is not (yet) a reality, it seems that AI
and autonomous decision-making systems cannot
be the bearers of states such as contempt, ani-
mosity, or disrespect that would be required for
a decision to qualify as discriminatory on such
accounts.
That said, proponents of mental state ac-
counts might similarly argue that algorithmic
decision-making systems might involve discrim-
3
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ination, without imputing the algorithm with
mental states. First, they might argue that hu-
man decision-makers, and data scientists respon-
sible for building decision models, might some-
times be condemned if they possess bad inten-
tions which result in them intentionally embed-
ding biases in their system, or if they negligently
ignore or overlook unintended disparities result-
ing from it. Second, as social epistemologists
have argued, we can sometimes still morally eval-
uate decisions which do not stem from one in-
dividual but are the result of multiple individ-
ual judgements aggregated in variously complex
ways Gilbert (2004); Pettit (2007). Drawing
from work on judgement aggregation problems
in economics and social choice theory, they ar-
gue that when suitably arranged in institutional
decision-making scenarios, groups of people can
be held morally responsible for their collective
judgements. Machine learning models trained on
data consisting of previous human judgements
might therefore be critiqued on similar grounds if
those individual judgements were themselves the
result of similarly discriminatory intent on the
part of those individuals.
However, aside from such special cases, it
seems that mental state accounts of discrim-
ination do not naturally transfer to the con-
text of algorithmic decision-making. If these ac-
counts are correct, we might therefore conclude
that algorithmic decision-making, while poten-
tially morally problematic, should not be charac-
terised as an example of wrongful discrimination.
Alternatively, other accounts of why discrimina-
tion is (sometimes) wrongful which are not based
on mental states of the decision-maker, might be
better able to accommodate discrimination of an
algorithmic variety.
2.2. Failing to treat people as individuals
One such account, which has received signifi-
cant attention in recent writing on discrimina-
tion, locates the wrongness of discrimination–in
both its direct and indirect varieties–in the ex-
tent to which it relies on inferences about in-
dividuals based on generalisations about groups
of which they are a member Lippert-Rasmussen
(2014). This objection is frequently raised in re-
sponse to what is often called statistical discrim-
ination Phelps (1972). Statistical discrimina-
tion is the use of statistical generalisations about
groups to infer attributes or future behaviours of
members of those groups. For instance, an em-
ployer might read evidence purporting to show
that smokers are generally less hard-working than
non-smokers, and reject a job application from
a smoker and give the job a less qualified non-
smoker who is anticipated to be more productive.
As economists have argued on the basis of
models, such generalisations about groups can be
an efficient means for firms to reduce risk when
more direct evidence about an individual is lack-
ing Phelps (1972). Despite the potential effi-
ciency benefits of generalisation, it is widely re-
garded as wrong in at least some cases. While
intuitions about the wrongfulness of statistical
discrimination are widely shared, it has proven
surprisingly difficult to articulate coherent objec-
tions to the practice, particularly when we go
beyond simple cases in which the inference is
simply unsupported by rigorous statistical anal-
ysis, to those where membership of a group re-
ally does correlate with an outcome of interest to
the decision-maker. Since algorithmic decision-
making could be regarded as a form of gener-
alisation on steroids, any account of discrimina-
tion which is grounded in the wrongness of gen-
eralisation would be particularly pertinent to our
present concerns.
On one popular account, statistical discrimi-
nation is wrong, even if the generalisations in-
volved have some truth, because it fails to treat
the decision-subject as an individual. Subject-
ing travellers from Muslim-majority countries to
harsher border checks on the basis of generalisa-
tions (whether true or false) about the prepon-
derance of terrorism amongst such groups fails
to consider each individual traveler on their own
merit. Similarly, rejecting a job applicant who
smokes because of evidence that smokers are on
average (let us assume, for the sake of argument)
less productive, unfairly punishes them as a re-
sult of the behaviour of other members of that
group. Such examples have led some to ground
objections to statistical discrimination in its fail-
ure to treat people as individuals. If this is cor-
rect, it presents a strong challenge to the very ex-
istence of algorithmic decision-making systems;
since they fail to treat people as individuals by
design. Given any two individuals with the same
attributes, a deterministic model will give the
4
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same output, and would therefore, on this ac-
count, be quintessentially discriminatory.
However, others have argued that the fail-
ure to treat people as individuals cannot
plausibly be the essence of wrongful dis-
crimination Schauer (2009); Dworkin (1981);
Lippert-Rasmussen (2014). One concern is that
this criterion is too broad because it encompasses
generalisation against any kind of group, not just
those categories enshrined in human rights law
such as gender, ‘race’, religion, etc. While such
categories readily trigger concerns about wrong-
ful discrimination, other categories like ‘smoker’
do not obviously invoke discrimination concerns.
This suggests that it is only generalisations about
certain groups that matter vis--vis discrimina-
tion. Others object that the very notion of ‘treat-
ing someone as an individual’ is misconceived;
they argue that, on closer inspection, even deci-
sions which appear to consider the individual are
in fact a disguised form of generalisation Schauer
(2009). Suppose that rather than using ‘smoker
/ non-smoker’ as a predictor of productivity, the
employer requires applicants to undergo some
test which more accurately predicts productivity;
even in this case, as Schauer argues, the employer
must rely upon generalizations from test scores to
on-the-job behavior. Test scores might be a more
accurate predictor than ‘smoker / non-smoker’,
but they are still fundamentally a form of gen-
eralization ( Schauer (2009), p68). Unless the
test is perfect, some people who perform badly
on it would nevertheless turn out to be relatively
productive on-the-job.
If this line of critique is correct, then it can-
not be the case that treating people differently
on the basis of generalisations about a category
they fit into is necessarily discriminatory in any
wrongful sense. What appear to be criticisms
of generalization in general(!), may in fact boil
down to criticisms of insufficiently precise means
of generalization. If the border security sys-
tem (or the recruitment process) could identify
more accurate predictor variables, which resulted
in fewer burdens on innocent tourists (or hard-
working smokers), then the charge of discrimi-
nation might lose some force. Of course, more
accurate predictions are likely to be more costly,
and as such tradeoffs must be made between the
harms and benefits of generalization; but either
way, this view suggests that anti-discrimination
does not necessarily require treating people as in-
dividuals. Rather, statistical discrimination may
be more or less morally permissible depending on
who and how many people are wrongly judged
on the basis of membership of whatever statis-
tical groups they may be part of, compared to
the costs involved in improving the accuracy of
the generalisation. If correct, this should be a
welcome conclusion for proponents of algorith-
mic systems, since they are essentially based on
generalisations in some form or other.
So far I have presented arguments which sug-
gest that there are difficulties with accounting for
algorithmic discrimination in terms of the wrong-
ness of mental states or of generalisations. Some
of these difficulties are internal to the philosoph-
ical accounts of discrimination, and others stem
from the dis-analogy between human and algo-
rithmic decision-makers. If the wrongness of (al-
gorithmic) discrimination does not consist in the
morally suspect intentions of decision-makers, or
in failing to treat people as individuals, then what
might it consist in? A more general set of egal-
itarian norms might provide a better footing for
a theory of algorithmic fairness. 2
3. Egalitarianism
Broadly speaking, egalitarianism is the idea that
people should be treated equally, and (some-
times) that certain valuable things should be
equally distributed. It might seem entirely ob-
vious that what makes discrimination wrongful
is something to do with egalitarianism. How-
ever, this connection has, perhaps surprisingly,
been resisted by many of the previously men-
tioned theorists of discrimination, with one even
claiming that any ‘connection between anti-
discrimination laws and equality it is at best neg-
ligible, and in any event is insufficient to count as
a justification’ Holmes (2005). Meanwhile, oth-
ers argue the opposite: that only a direct appeal
to egalitarian norms can satisfactorily account
for everything that is wrong about discrimina-
tion Segall (2012). For our current purposes,
2. However, even if philosophical accounts of discrimina-
tion do not easily apply to algorithmic decisions, call-
ing an algorithmic system discriminatory, (or specifi-
cally sexist, racist, etc.) might still be justified by its
rhetorical power, or as useful shorthand in everyday
discourse.
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this debate can be safely sidestepped. This is
not because it is uninteresting or unimportant
as a philosophical project. Rather, our purpose
here is to examine how egalitarian norms might
provide an account of why and when algorithmic
systems can be considered unfair; whether or not
such unfairness should rightfully be considered a
form of discrimination, per se, is not our concern.
This section therefore provides a brief overview
of some major debates within egalitarianism and
draws out their significance for fair machine
learning.
3.1. The currency of egalitarianism and
spheres of justice
Invariably in machine learning contexts where
fairness issues arise, a system is mapping indi-
viduals to different outcome classes which are as-
sumed to have negative and positive effects; such
as being approved / denied a financial loan, high
or low insurance prices, or a greater or fewer num-
ber of years spent under incarceration. We as-
sume that these outcome classes are means or
barriers to some fundamentally valuable object
or set of objects which ought to be to some ex-
tent equally distributed. But what exactly is
the ‘currency’ of egalitarianism that lies behind
the valuation of these outcome classes? Egalitar-
ians have articulated various competing views,
including welfare, understood in terms of plea-
sure or preference-satisfaction Cohen (1989); re-
sources such as income and assets Rawls (2009);
Dworkin (1981); or capabilities, understood as
both the ability and resources necessary to do
certain things Sen (1992). Others propose that
inequalities in welfare, resources, or capabilities
may be acceptable, so long as citizens have equal
political and democratic status Anderson (1999).
The question of what egalitarianism is con-
cerned with (the ‘equality of what?’ debate as
it is sometimes referred to), is relevant to our as-
sumptions about the impact of different algorith-
mic decision outcomes. In many cases – like the
automated allocation of loans, or the setting of
insurance premiums – the decision outcomes pri-
marily affect distribution of resources. In others
– like algorithmic blocking or banning of users
from an online discussion – the decisions may
be more directly related to distribution of wel-
fare or capabilities. The importance of each cur-
rency of egalitarianism may plausibly differ be-
tween contexts, thus affecting how we account for
the potentially differential impacts of algorithmic
decision-making systems.
This debate also trades heavily on the intu-
ition that different people may value the same
outcome or set of harms and benefits differently;
yet most existing work on fair machine learning
assumes a uniform valuation of decision outcomes
across different populations. In some cases it may
be safe to assume that different sub-groups are
equally likely to regard a particular outcome class
– e.g. being denied a loan, or being hired for a job
- as bad or good. But in other cases, especially in
personalisation and recommender systems where
there are multiple outcome classes with no ob-
vious universally agreed-on rank order, this as-
sumption may be flawed.
A connected debate concerns whether we
should apply a single egalitarian calculus across
different social contexts, or whether there are in-
ternal ‘spheres of justice’ in which different in-
commensurable logics of fairness might apply,
and between which redistributions might not be
appropriate Walzer (2008). For instance, with
regard to civil and democratic rights like voting
in elections, the aim of egalitarianism might be
absolute equal distribution of the good, rather
than merely equality of opportunity to compete
for it. This idea would explain the intuition that
voter registration tests are wrong, while tests for
jobs are not. Requiring some form of test prior
to voting may ensure equality of opportunity in
the sense that everyone has an equal opportunity
to take the test; but since talent and efforts are
not equally distributed, some people may fail the
test, and there would not be equality of outcome.
But an essential element of democracy, one might
argue, is that voting rights shouldn’t depend on
talent or effort. However, when it comes to com-
petition for social positions and economic goods,
we may be concerned with ensuring equality of
opportunity but less concerned about equality of
outcome. We may consider it fair, other things
being equal, that the most qualified applicant ob-
tains the role, and that the most industrious and
/ or talented individuals deserve more economic
benefits than others (even if we believe that cur-
rent systems do not actually ensure a level play-
ing field, and some level of income redistribution
is also morally required).
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Different contexts being subject to different
spheres of justice would have a direct bearing on
the appropriateness of certain fairness-correcting
methods in those contexts. Equality of oppor-
tunity may be an appropriate metric to apply
to models that will be deployed in the sphere of
‘economic justice’; e.g. selection of candidates for
job interviews or calculation of insurance. But in
contexts which fall under the sphere of civil jus-
tice, we may want to impose more blunt metrics
like equality of outcome (or ‘parity of impact’).
This might be the case for airport security checks,
where it is important to a sense of social solidar-
ity that no group is over-examined as a result of
a predictive system, even if there really are differ-
ences in base rates Hellman (2008). We therefore
can’t assume that fairness metrics which are ap-
propriate in one context will be appropriate in
another.
3.2. Luck and desert
A second major strand of debate in egalitarian
thinking considers the role of notions like choice
Huseby (2016) and desert Temkin (1986) in de-
termining which inequalities are acceptable? In
which circumstances, and to what extent, should
people be held responsible for the unequal status
they find themselves in? So-called ‘luck egali-
tarians’ aim to answer this question by propos-
ing that the ideal solution should allow those in-
equalities resulting from people’s free choices and
informed risk-taking, but disregard those which
are the result of brute luck Arneson (1989). As
free-willed individuals, we are capable of mak-
ing choices and bearing their consequences, which
may sometimes make us better or worse off than
others. The choices we make may deserve cer-
tain rewards and punishments. However, where
inequalities are the result of circumstances out-
side an individual’s control (e.g. being born with
a debilitating health condition, or being born into
a culture in which one’s skin colour results in sys-
temically worse treatment), egalitarians argue for
their correction. However, defining a principle
which can demarcate between those inequalities
which are and are not chosen or deserved is a
tricky prospect, one which has vexed egalitarians
for centuries.
The luck egalitarian aim of pursuing redistri-
bution only where inequalities are due to pure
luck, and leaving in place inequalities which are
the result of personal choices and informed gam-
bles, raises interesting questions for which vari-
ables should be included in fair ML models.
High-profile controversies around the creation of
criminal recidivism risk scoring in the US, no-
tably the COMPAS system, have focused pri-
marily on the differential impacts on African
American and Caucasian subjects Angwin et al.
(2016). But one of the potentially objectionable
features of the COMPAS scoring system was not
the use of ‘race’ as a variable (which it did not),
but rather its use of variables which are not the
result of individuals’ choices, such as being part
of a family, social circle, or neighbourhood with
higher rates of crime. These may be objection-
able in part because they correlate with ‘race’ in
the U.S., but they are also objectionable more
generally to the extent that they are not the re-
sult of personal choices. As such, any inequalities
that arise from them should not, on the luck egal-
itarian view, be tolerated.
Furthermore, as critics of luck egalitarianism
have argued, sometimes even inequalities which
are the result of choice still ought to be compen-
sated. For instance, as Elizabeth Anderson has
argued, standard luck egalitarianism leads to the
vulnerability of dependent caretakers, because it
would not compensate those who are responsible
for choosing to care for dependents rather than
working a wage-earning job full time Anderson
(1999). This is what Thayson and Albertson call
a ‘costly rescue’ Thaysen and Albertsen (2017);
on their view, luck egalitarianism should only be
sensitive to responsibility for creating advantages
and disadvantages – not to responsibility for dis-
tributing them. Thus, individuals who voluntar-
ily place themselves in unequal positions might
sometimes deserve compensation if their choice
served some important social purpose. To re-
turn to the COMPAS case, even if certain vari-
ables like one’s social circle or neighbourhood
were the result of individual choice (which is per-
haps more likely to be the case for the economi-
cally advantaged), such choices may nevertheless
deserve protection from negative consequences.
This might apply in cases like those outlined by
Anderson, Thayson and Albertson above; for in-
stance, one might choose to remain a resident in
a high crime neighbourhood in order to make a
positive difference to the community.
7
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3.3. Deontic justice
In applying egalitarian political philosophy to
the analysis of particular instances of inequal-
ity, these abstract principles need to be supple-
mented with empirical claims about how and
why certain circumstances obtain. This re-
flects the sense in which egalitarianism can be,
in Derek Parfit’s terms, deontic; that is, not
concerned with an unequal state of affairs per
se, but rather with the way in which that
state of affairs was produced Parfit (1997).
Where analytic philosophy ends, sociology, his-
tory, economics, and other nascent disciplines
are needed, to understand the specific ways in
which some groups come to be unfairly disad-
vantaged Fang and Moro (2010); Hooks (1992).
Only then can we meaningfully evaluate whether
and to what extent a given disparity is unfair.
But consideration of historical and sociological
contexts can also inform philosophical accounts
and raise new questions. One example is in the
attribution of responsibility; who should be held
responsible for the initial creation of inequalities,
and who should be held responsible for correct-
ing them? Can historical injustices perpetrated
by an institution in the past ground present-day
claims for redistribution? Is a particular instance
of unequal treatment of a particular group worse
if it takes place in a wider context of inequality
for that group, compared to a general pattern of
benign or advantageous treatment?
Abstracting away from particular cases and
considering broader historical and social trends
may better enable us to account for what makes
certain forms of unequal treatment particularly
concerning. In discussing what makes racial pro-
filing worse than other forms of profiling, even if
it is based on statistical facts, Kasper Lippert-
Rasmussen argues ( Lippert-Rasmussen (2014),
p. 300):
‘Statistical facts are often facts about
how we choose to act. Since we can
morally evaluate how we choose to act,
we cannot simply take statistical facts
for granted when justifying policies:
we need to ask the prior question of
whether it can be justified that we make
these statistical facts obtain’
On this view, the particular wrongness of racial
profiling can only be understood by appealing
to the social processes which cause the statisti-
cal regularities to obtain in the first place. In
Lippert-Rasmussen’s example, the reason racial
profiling for crime in the U.S. ‘works’ (if it does
at all), may be due to things that the white ma-
jority do or fail to do which might reduce or elim-
inate the reliability of such statistical inferences.
Similarly, such ‘deontic’, historical and socio-
logical considerations can provide critical back-
ground information which is likely to be cru-
cially relevant in determinations of fairness in
particular algorithmic decision-making contexts.
Historical causes of inequalities and broader ex-
isting social structures cannot be ignored when
deploying models in such contexts. At a ba-
sic level, this means that feature selection–both
for protected characteristics and other variables–
should be informed by such information, but it
also might determine which disparities take pri-
ority in fairness analysis and mitigation if more
than one exists. More broadly, deontic consider-
ations may help situate and illuminate the moral
tensions that arise between different and incom-
patible fairness metrics. Returning to the debate
about the COMPAS criminal recidivism scoring
system, where unequal base rates mean that ac-
curacy equity is mathematically impossible to
achieve alongside equalised false positive rates,
a deontic egalitarian perspective suggests focus-
ing attention on the historic reasons for such un-
equal base rates. While this may not in itself di-
rectly resolve the question of which fairness met-
ric ought to apply, it does suggest that part of
the answer should involve consideration of the
historic and contemporary factors responsible for
the broader social situation from which the in-
compatibility dilemma arises.
3.4. Distributive versus representative
harms
Finally, it is important to note that some aspects
of egalitarian fairness may not be distributive in
a direct way, in the sense that they concern the
distribution of benefits and harms to specific peo-
ple from specific decisions. Rather, they may be
about the fair representation of different iden-
tities, cultures, ethnicities, languages, or other
social categories. For instance, states with mul-
tiple official languages may have a duty to ensure
equal representation of each language, a duty
8
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which need not derive from any specific claims
about the unequal benefits and harms to indi-
vidual members of each linguistic group Taylor
(1994). Similar arguments might be made about
cultural representation in official documents, or
even within the editorial policies of institutions in
receipt of public money. Even private institutions
might well voluntarily impose such duties upon
themselves. There is a debate about the extent to
which equal cultural recognition and distributive
egalitarianism are truly distinct notions; some ar-
gue that ‘recognition and distribution are two
irreducible elements of a satisfactory theory of
justice’, while others that ‘any dispute regarding
redistribution of wealth or resources is reducible
to a claim over the social valorisation of specific
group or individual traits’ Fraser and Honneth
(2003).
Such notions of representational fairness cap-
ture many of the most high-profile controver-
sial examples of algorithmic bias. For in-
stance, much-reported work on gender and other
biases in the language corpora used to pro-
duce word embeddings is an example of rep-
resentational fairness Bolukbasi et al. (2016);
Caliskan-Islam et al. (2016). In such cases, the
problem is not necessarily one of specific harms
to specific members of a social group, but rather
one of the way in which certain groups are repre-
sented in digital cultural artefacts, such as nat-
ural language classifiers or search engine results.
This may require different ways of approaching
fairness and bias since the notions of differen-
tial group impacts and treating like people alike
do not apply; instead, the goal might be to en-
sure equal representation of groups in a ranking
Zehlike et al. (2017), or to give due weight to dif-
ferent normative / ideological outlooks in a clas-
sifier which automates the enforcement of norms
Binns et al. (2017).
4. Conclusion
Current approaches to fair machine learning are
typically focused on interventions at the data
preparation, model-learning or post-processing
stages. This is understandable given the typi-
cal remit of data scientists who are intended to
carry out these processes. However, there is a
danger that this results in an approach which fo-
cuses on a narrow, static set of prescribed pro-
tected classes, derived from law and devoid of
context, without considering why those classes
are protected and how they relate to the partic-
ular justice aspects of the application in ques-
tion. Philosophical accounts of discrimination
and fairness prompt reflection on these more fun-
damental questions, and suggest avenues for fur-
ther consideration of what might be relevant and
why.
This raises a series of practical challenges
which may limit how effective and systematic fair
ML approaches can be in practice. Attempting
to translate and elucidate the differences between
such egalitarian theories in the context of partic-
ular machine learning tasks will likely be tricky.
In simple cases, it may be that feature vectors
used to train models include personal charac-
teristics which can intuitively be classed as ei-
ther chosen or unchosen (and therefore legiti-
mate or illegitimate grounds for differential treat-
ment according to e.g. luck egalitarianism). But
more often, a contextually appropriate approach
to fairness which truly captures the essence of
the relevant philosophical points may hinge on
factors which are not typically present in the
data available in situ. Such missing data may
include the protected characteristics of affected
individuals Veale and Binns (2017), but also in-
formation relevant to an assessment of an indi-
vidual’s responsibility, culpability or desert–such
as their socio-economic circumstances, life expe-
rience, personal development, and the relation-
ships between them. Attempts to draw such con-
clusions from training data and lists of legally
protected categories alone, are unlikely to do jus-
tice to the way that questions of justice arise in
idiosyncratic lives and differing social contexts.
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